

The "New Normal" in Liner Shipping: Are Policies Fit for Purpose?

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Theory

Shipping


Terminal

Forwarder

Intermodal



Practice






Regulation

Shipping special regimes:

- Competition
- State aid
- Taxation







Key messages

- Pure liner shipping only exists in theory.
- Practice is much more hybrid. Most major liner companies have integrated other activities: terminal operations, freight forwarding and intermodal transport ("door-to-door"). In other words: <u>vertical integration</u>
- EU regulation does not take account of this, perpetuating special regimes for liner shipping: <u>competition</u>, <u>state</u> <u>aid</u> and <u>taxation</u>
- In this way, regulation creates market distortions that risk to increase in the future




Market shares of shipping in other sectors





~15% (ocean freight)






1. Competition: EU regulation

- Shipping cartels outlawed in 2004. (Cartels influence freight rates via joint coordination of prices/capacity).
- Cooperation agreements are facilitated via the Consortia block exemption regulation since 1995, revised in 2009.
- Goal: economies of scale. A fair share should be passed on to transport users (frequency, quality, reliability).
- Special privileges for liner shipping: capacity management, information exchange, joint negotiation.
- "...the <u>combined</u> market share of the consortium members in the relevant shall not exceed 30%" art. 5(1)



1. Competition: capacity management

"capacity adjustments in response to fluctuations in supply and demand"



Source: ITF based on Alphaliner, Shanghai Shipping Exchange



1. Competition: information exchange

Which information is exchanged?

- Volumes moved by carriers in each direction of trades
- Average revenue per TEU earned by carrier per trade
- Demand and supply forecasts

What do carriers know of each others via consortia?

 Reference costs (fuel costs, vessel operating costs and depreciation costs); per service or trade.

Price information exchange where conferences are allowed Intensifying information exchange via TradeLens, DCSA


Do freight forwarders have access to this information and similar possibilities of information exchange?

Source: ITF 2018, ITF 2019



1. Competition: a conglomerate of consortia

Large majority of trade routes to/from Europe operated by one conglomerate





1. Competition: joint negotiation

CBER generous on joint negotiation with suppliers.

Market power plus vertical integration creates risks:

- "An offer you cannot refuse"
- Unfair competition in non-shipping markets (terminal, intermodal) via product bundling, predatory pricing or forcing of own product.
- Interference in complaints via trade associations.
- This hollows out the function of forwarders: to offer best package of transport options.



1. Competition: which corrective capacity?

Passing on a fair share of CBER benefits to transport users?

	2015-2019	2020
Freight rate		
Frequency		
Reliability		
Connectivity		

Regulators: a problem of legal clarity, monitoring, sanctions Countervailing powers: who understands, who dares to complain?



2. Maritime State aid: EU regulation

- Maritime State Aid Guidelines 1989, 1997 and 2004
- Beneficiaries: shipping companies
- Aim: provide clarity which support measures are compatible with internal market: "not adversely affect trading conditions contrary to the common interest".
- In parallel: Commission decisions on notified measures by member states.
- For example: ~24 decisions on tonnage tax since 2004 that define – often expand - the boundaries of what the Commission allows.



2. Maritime State aid & vertical integration (1)

- The 2004 Guidelines do not indicate that the tonnage tax can cover non-shipping activities.
- However, Commission decisions have approved "ancillary activities" that can be covered by the tonnage tax: e.g. terminal handling, storage and demurrage.
- So: 1-2% tax rate instead of the regular CIT rate.
- This applies to activities carried out by operator in the same group as the shipping firm applying tonnage tax.
- Who benefits? Vertically integrated shipping groups, at the cost of independent shipping, terminals, forwarders
- Incentive for carrier haulage instead of merchant haulage



2. Maritime State aid & vertical integration (2)

Which ancillary activities can be covered in tonnage tax schemes in EU?

Ancillary activities	Most recent examples	
Self-handling	Estonia (2019)	
Terminal cargo handling	Croatia (2020), Cyprus (2019)	
Temporary on-dock storage	Croatia (2020), Cyprus (2019)	
Consolidation/breaking cargo	Cyprus (2020)	
Customs clearance	Croatia (2020)	
Office facilities	Croatia (2020), Cyprus (2019)	
Road haulage	Croatia (2020)	

This creates market distortions throughout the EU market: a German freight forwarder can be disadvantaged because of a tonnage tax scheme in Cyprus



2. Maritime State aid & vertical integration (3)

Not just a theoretical possibility

	Effective corporate income tax rate
Integrated terminal operators	14%
Non-integrated terminal operators	21%
Shipping	7%

Source: Merk 2020



3. Taxation

OECD/G20 GLOBE Inclusive Framework Blueprint:

- 1. Digital Tax. International maritime shipping excluded
- 2. Global minimum tax for multinational enterprises. Maritime shipping possibly <u>excluded</u>.

Current effective corporate income tax rate:

- 27% for freight forwarders
- 7% for shipping.


Impacts on level playing field in freight forwarding?

Public consultation: contributions until 14 December 2020:

https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-reports-on-pillar-one-and-pillar-two-blueprints-october-2020.pdf



Avenues for reform: cancel, delimit or enlarge






Recent ITF work on liner shipping











Thank you!

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